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THE LESSONS OF ABADAN AND SUEZ
FOR BRITISH FOREIGN
POLICYMAKERS IN THE 1960s *
P ETER J. B ECK
Kingston University
A B S T R ACT. Responding positively to the 1957 ‘ funding experience ’ initiative encouraging Whitehall
departments to use history more systematically in their everyday work, the Foreign Oﬃce commissioned a
pilot project centred upon the 1951 Anglo-Iranian Abadan crisis. The resulting study, completed by Rohan
Butler in 1962, included a lengthy section drawing lessons from the historical narrative. During the early
1960s Butler’s Abadan history, attracting interest and comment from both ministers and oﬃcials, fed into
ongoing reviews of British foreign policy and methods stimulated by the 1956 Suez debacle and Britain’s
initial failure to join the Common Market (1963). Confronting policymakers with the contemporary realities
aﬀecting Britain’s role in the world, the history prompted serious thinking about the case for a radical change
of direction in both foreign policy and methods. Generally speaking, the Foreign Oﬃce has made little use of
history in the actual policymaking process. From this perspective, this episode, centred upon Butler’s Abadan
history, oﬀers a useful case study illuminating any appraisal of history’s potential as a policy input, most
notably concerning the role of historical analogies in the formulation, conduct, and presentation of British
foreign policy.
At 12.32 hours on 3 October 1951 the cruiser HMS Mauritius cast oﬀ from Abadan
for Basra.1 The ship’s band was playing – reportedly, the ‘Colonel Bogey ’ march
was prominent in its repertoire – but the occasion was far from joyful. Sailing
along the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, the warship passed the vast Abadan oil
reﬁnery, formerly the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), but
nationalized in May 1951 by the Iranian government headed by Mohammad
Mossadegh.2 Subsequently, escalating tension, punctuated by abortive diplomatic
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston upon Thames, KT1 2EE
P.Beck@kingston.ac.uk
* This article, based upon the keynote lecture delivered to BISA’s British International History
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1951 ; Norman Kemp, Abadan: a ﬁrst-hand account of the Persian oil crisis (London, 1953), pp. 239–50;
James Cable, Intervention at Abadan: plan buccaneer (Basingstoke, 1991), p. 100.
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initiatives, culminated in the reﬁnery’s closure and eventual British evacuation on
3 October, when HMS Mauritius was used to withdraw some 280 members of the
AIOC’s British staﬀ still remaining in the country.
Terminating Britain’s involvement in Iran’s oil industry dating back to the 1901
D’Arcy concession, evacuation was represented by The Times as ‘a humiliating
defeat ’ for a country still regarding itself as a major world power : ‘The British
have been forced out of Persia because the Persian Government was resolved to
force them out and because the British Government were not … resolved
to stay. ’3 For The Daily Telegraph, ‘From today, the word Abadan passes as a
common noun into the vocabulary of national humiliation. ’4 The impact of
media representations of British withdrawal without a ﬁght in the face of Iran’s
escalating nationalist demands was accentuated by the loss of what was presented
as Britain’s biggest single overseas investment owned by a company with a
majority government shareholding. Unsurprisingly, the episode prompted press
references to the edging-out process begun in India a few years earlier as well as
expressions of concern about Britain’s uncertain future. For Norman Kemp, who
reported events from Abadan in 1951, ‘ to other small countries where dissentient
opinion preached against the British, the shattering triumph of the weak Iranian
nation was a textbook example’.5
Within Britain, the fact that withdrawal coincided with both the closing days of
the Labour party conference at Scarborough and the opening skirmishes of the
October 1951 General Election campaign imparted an added political edge to
domestic debates. Launching the Conservative party’s campaign at Liverpool on
2 October, Winston Churchill accused Clement Attlee, the prime minister
(1945–51), of breaking his word about safeguarding the British presence in
Abadan.6 On the next day, Herbert Morrison, the foreign secretary, used his
Scarborough conference speech to mount a vigorous defence of the Labour
government’s policy in a manner reviving longstanding controversies about
warmongering and appeasement, as epitomized during succeeding weeks by the
Daily Mirror’s infamous ‘Whose ﬁnger on the trigger? ’ front-page headline and
the frequent mention of ‘Munich’ as a historical reference point.7
I
In an editorial, published on 5 October 1951, The Times used Britain’s withdrawal
from Abadan to draw attention to serious ‘Faults in diplomacy’ in an editorial
given enhanced historical signiﬁcance by the 1956 Suez crisis :
An opportunity of learning from mistakes rarely presents itself on this scale … It is not a
failure that Britain can aﬀord to repeat … The cumulative evidence of failure is so great
3 Times, 3 Oct. 1951. 4 Daily Telegraph, 4 Oct. 1951. 5 Kemp, Abadan, p. 238.
6 Times, 3 Oct. 1951.
7 Times, 4, 9, 20 Oct. 1951 ; Daily Mirror, 9, 24, 25 Oct. 1951 ; ‘Middle East Munich’, Economist, 6 Oct.
1951, pp. 779–80.
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that an urgent case clearly arises for the relevant documents on the dispute to be given to
the country in the fullest possible form … It is not for the sake of ﬁnding scapegoats that
these matters need to be made clear ; the lessons of a muddle have to be learned so what
happened in Persia will not be allowed to happen – as it could easily happen – elsewhere.8
However, as John Dickie, an experienced diplomatic correspondent, has
acknowledged, generally speaking the Foreign Oﬃce has adopted an ‘ostrich
posture’ towards learning lessons from past mistakes : ‘Diplomatic post-mortem
examinations of policy are rare inside the Foreign Oﬃce … It is unusual for the
policy-making process to be reviewed after a major event. ’9 Dickie’s assertion was
conﬁrmed by Zara Steiner, who concluded that the Foreign Oﬃce has made
‘only limited use ’ of history in actually making policy.10 Preoccupied with today’s
world and the immediate future, ministers and oﬃcials have always found it
diﬃcult to draw history into the policymaking process. Nor are things any
diﬀerent across the Atlantic. Drawing upon their experience of teaching a course
at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government to policymakers ‘about how to use
experience, whether remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today
about the prospect for tomorrow’, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt identiﬁed
the key problem: ‘They’re too busy. Can’t read what they get now. They’ll glance
at papers in the limousine, thumb them while someone is talking, or just wing it. If
you do get their attention, you can’t keep it. They will have to catch a plane or go
to a press conference. ’11
In any case, policymakers rarely know exactly what they expect of history.
Clearly, the last thing required in a crisis situation is a lengthy history however
well researched and authoritative. Nor, given their penchant for drawing ana-
logies between past and present, do policymakers want to be told that this practice
is fundamentally unhistorical. What they really want is to be given an appropriate
historical quote or example to employ for rhetorical eﬀect in a forthcoming
speech or to have complex matters concerning, say, background, context, or
analogues, simply and clearly explained, but – to quote Steiner – ‘without the
qualiﬁcations that are almost the hallmark of our profession’.12 Analogies,
enabling the current situation to be presented straightforwardly in shorthand
form as like some previous occasion, have proved attractive for this very reason.
But, like statistics, analogies can be, and are, used and abused. Just as what seems
an appropriate precedent may be squeezed to ﬁt the situation in order to put
a familiar face on something strange, so ‘bothersome analogues ’ might be
conveniently dodged.13 Nor might account be taken of the fact that current
circumstances may no longer be conducive to an analogue’s application.
8 Times, 5 Oct. 1951. 9 John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Oﬃce (London, 1992), pp. 236–7.
10 Zara Steiner, ‘The historian and the foreign oﬃce’, in C. Hill and P. Beshoﬀ, eds., Two worlds
of international relations : academic practitioners and the trade in ideas (London, 1994), p. 50.
11 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in time : the uses of history for decision makers (New
York, 1986), p. xxii, p. 4. 12 Steiner, ‘The historian’, p. 46.
13 Neustadt and May, Thinking in time, p. 79.
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Within this context, the historian’s task is to encourage policymakers to use
history better, and especially to foster the application of historical analogies in a
manner designed to assist, not mislead, decision-makers. Detached from day-to-
day oﬃcial responsibilities, historians are also well equipped, it is argued, to
challenge traditional mindsets by prompting thinking about alternative ways
forward within and outside the box. In particular, they can teach policymakers to
place actors and complex events in the continuum of time, since ‘an under-
standing of the past helps with the placing of the present situation and casts light
on probable outcomes’.14 For John Lewis Gaddis, policymakers can only beneﬁt
from the way in which history enables them to look backwards when going
forwards into an uncertain future.
History can serve something of the function a rear-view mirror does in an automobile.
One would not want to drive down the road with eyes glued to the mirror because
sooner or later one would wind up in the ditch. But the mirror is useful in determining
where one has been; it is even more helpful in revealing who, or what, is coming up from
behind, a consideration of some importance in what is still a competitive international
environment.15
In a fast-moving and often dangerous world, Gaddis’s ‘ rear-view mirror ’ example
epitomizes history’s ability to expand the immediate experience of policymakers,
particularly by making them aware of long-term patterns like the ever-changing
power balance, the risks of over-commitment or the intimate correlation between
power and economic performance. It recalls also an assertion attributed to Mark
Twain to the eﬀect that ‘History doesn’t repeat itself ; at best it rhymes. ’
I I
Images of the Abadan crisis remain inﬂuential in present-day Iran, where ‘Oil
Nationalization Day’ is still celebrated. By contrast, in Britain this earlier dispute
has been pushed to the margins of people’s memories and histories, if not
completely obscured, by the 1956 Suez crisis. Then, the British resort to force,
resulting in part from Anthony Eden’s portrayal of President Nasser as another
dangerous and unappeasable dictator in the Hitler mould, failed to reverse
Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, let alone achieve the
projected regime change. Certainly, the resulting crisis, presented frequently as a
seminal moment in Britain’s history, proved – to quote Kipling’s phrase, as used
by one of Eden’s ministers for the title of his memoirs – ‘no end of a lesson’.16 For
John Young, events revealed ‘Britain’s lack of economic strength and reliance on
the US’ : ‘What Suez did show was Britain’s inability to wield large-scale military
14 Steiner, ‘The historian’, p. 45 ; Zara Steiner, ‘On writing international history: chaps, maps and
much more’, International Aﬀairs, 73 (1997), pp. 531–46, at p. 538.
15 J. L. Gaddis, ‘New conceptual approaches to the study of American foreign relations: inter-
disciplinary perspectives ’, Diplomatic History, 14 (1990), pp. 405–23, at p. 423.
16 Anthony Nutting, No end of a lesson : the story of Suez (London, 1967), pp. 7–16.
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power, even in cooperation with its ally of 1914 and 1939, France. ’17 Perhaps
Suez’s actual impact has been over-stated, but its perceived lessons fuelled
declinist narratives about Britain. Moreover, like ‘appeasement ’ and ‘Munich ’,
‘Suez’ became an enduring part of contemporary British political vocabulary, as
evidenced by the way in which such terms helped frame the bitter controversies
surrounding British policy towards the 2003 Iraq war. For example, Robin Cook,
who resigned as leader of the House of Commons in March 2003 in protest at
British policy, frequently urged Tony Blair, the prime minister, to worry about
parallels with Suez’.18 Indeed, following one exchange, he parted by warning, ‘All
I ask is that every morning you remember what happened to Anthony Eden. ’
By contrast, ‘Abadan’ strikes no real political chord in Britain today. Even
worse, the 1951 Abadan crisis, like the British relationship with Iran, is normally
glossed over in histories and international relations texts, excepting several
publications by William Roger Louis and a spate of recent studies prompted in
part by the release of ﬁles previously subject to extended closure.19 Why should
we study the Abadan crisis? In particular, why does it rate a stop en route
from Munich to Suez? Following Goldsworthy, did the Abadan crisis pre-empt
the Suez dispute in bringing together the mounting pressures upon British power,
even serving as a kind of dress rehearsal for 1956?20 As outlined above, the dispute
came to a head in 1951, when Iran’s nationalization of the oil industry culminated
in British evacuation of Abadan and the eventual rupture of Anglo-Iranian
diplomatic relations (October 1952). In August 1953 Mossadegh’s fall from power,
arising from a covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and MI6 operation
17 John Young, Britain and the world in the twentieth century (London, 1997), pp. 166–7.
18 Robin Cook, The point of departure (London, 2003), pp. 203, 224; Robert Fisk, ‘New crisis, old
lessons’, Independent, 15 Jan. 2003; Robin Cook, ‘The invasion of Iraq was Britain’s worst foreign policy
blunder since Suez’, Independent, 19 Mar. 2004.
19 J. H. Bamberg, The history of the British Petroleum Company, II : The Anglo-Iranian years, 1928–1954
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 383–511; Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Mussaddiq and the dilemmas of British
imperialism’, in J. A. Bill and Wm. R. Louis, eds.,Mussaddiq, Iranian nationalism, and oil (London, 1988),
pp. 228–60; Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab nationalism, the United
States and postwar imperialism (Oxford, 1984) ; Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Britain and the overthrow of the
Mosaddeq government ’, in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and
the 1953 coup in Iran (Syracuse, 2004), pp. 126–77; Steve Marsh, ‘HMG, AIOC and the Anglo-Iranian
oil crisis : in defence of Anglo-Iranian’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12 (2001), pp. 143–74; Steve Marsh,
Anglo-American relations and Cold War oil : crisis in Iran (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 169–94; Sue Onslow,
‘ ‘‘Battlelines for Suez’’ : the Abadan crisis of 1951 and the formation of the Suez Group’, Contemporary
British History, 17 (2003), pp. 1–28; Ian Speller, ‘ ‘‘A splutter of musketry? ’’ : the British military response
to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1951 ’, Contemporary British History, 17 (2003), pp. 39–66; Amy
L. S. Staples, ‘Seeing diplomacy through bankers’ eyes : the World Bank, the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis,
and the Aswan High Dam’, Diplomatic History, 26 (2002), pp. 397–418; ‘Document: a very British
coup’, BBC Radio Four, 22 Aug. 2005; Donald N. Wilber, Clandestine service history : overthrow of premier
Mossadegh of Iran, November 1952–August 1953 (Washington DC, Mar. 1954) : http://www.nytimes.com/
library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html accessed 24 Apr. 2004.
20 D. Goldsworthy, ‘Keeping change within bounds: aspects of colonial policy during the Churchill
and Eden governments, 1951–1957’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 18 (1990), pp. 81–108, at
p. 103.
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ushering in the dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah, prepared the way for the
resumption of diplomatic relations (December 1953) and the Anglo-Iranian
settlement secured in August 1954. Iran’s oil industry remained nationalized, but
henceforth eﬀective control was exercised by an international consortium,
including ﬁve American companies, but leaving the AIOC (renamed the British
Petroleum Company Ltd in 1954) as the largest single stakeholder.
For historians, the resulting crisis yields revealing insights into a wide range
of issues : post-1945 British policy and power, including Britain’s retreat from
global commitments ; the problematic Anglo-Iranian relationship; the evolving
Anglo-American relationship ; the clandestine activities of the CIA and MI6; the
emerging challenge of nationalism; the strategic role of oil diplomacy;
the growing frailties of the British economy; the interface between big business
and government ; the World Bank’s attempt to act as ‘a global corporatist
manager of international economic relations ’ oﬀering an alternative approach
to international diplomacy; the contrasting foreign policy priorities of British
political parties and government departments ; the BBC’s role in British govern-
ment propaganda; and the outcome of the October 1951 general election, as
Clement Attlee’s Labour administration gave way in the midst of the Abadan
crisis to Winston Churchill’s Conservative government.21 More importantly for
this article, the dispute proved the subject of an experimental Foreign Oﬃce
history designed less to record what happened but rather to investigate and test
the value of history as an input to the policymaking process. As such, the resulting
study oﬀers useful insights informing any appraisal of the case for and against the
systematic use of history in the everyday work of British government.
I I I
The resulting Abadan history was not so much a Foreign Oﬃce initiative as a
response to a broader Whitehall proposal designed to improve departmental
memories and the eﬃciency of the governmental machine. As the Second World
War Civil Series oﬃcial histories project drew to a close in 1957, Sir Norman
Brook, the cabinet secretary and head of the Home Civil Service, sounded out
departments whether this ‘very successful experiment ’ held ‘any practical lessons
for the future’.22 Fearing that the series would ‘ founder on the rocks of political
controversy ’, Brook ruled out publishing peacetime oﬃcial histories, but hoped to
retain the fundamental principle underlying the oﬃcial histories, that is to ‘ fund
experience for government use ’ as ‘an aid to current administration’. For Brook,
histories oﬀering a ‘consecutive narrative’ over time for ‘particular episodes of
policy or administration which have been of particular signiﬁcance in a depart-
ment’s work’ promised to provide a departmental memory as well as a welcome
21 Staples, ‘Seeing diplomacy through bankers ’ eyes ’, p. 397.
22 Brook to heads of departments, 5 Dec. 1957, NA, CAB103/562.
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sense of historical perspective for current issues. They would also ﬁll an existing
gap:
It is a feature of our administrative system that we make many forecasts but few retrospects.
More post-mortems would be salutary – not, of course, for the purpose of attributing
praise or blame but of analysing how forecasts and judgments originally made have stood
the test of time.
Brook acknowledged departmental concerns about costs and staﬃng, but
anticipated that in the long term the resulting simpliﬁcation and speeding up of
policymaking through using history would save time and money!
Nor were Brook’s proposals for the functional use of history mere theoretical
speculation. As joint permanent secretary to the Treasury, he had followed closely
its pilot ‘ funding experience’ projects conducted by Margaret Gowing, whose
editorial responsibilities for the wartime oﬃcial histories had largely disap-
peared.23 Encouraged by its ‘ satisfactory’ results, Brook suggested the project’s
formalization and extension through Whitehall.24 In the event, his proposal
evoked a somewhat mixed, frequently unenthusiastic, response. Unsurprisingly,
the most supportive reply came from Brook’s own department, the Treasury,
where Gowing’s initial work provided the foundation for the eventual creation of
the Treasury Historical Section.25
Otherwise, one of the more positive initial reactions emanated from the
Foreign Oﬃce, where Brook’s initiative was taken up by its Steering Committee
in April 1958.26 Chaired by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, the Permanent Under
Secretary of State (PUS), the committee noted that, quite apart from an active
historical publications programme centred upon the Documents on British Foreign
Policy (DBFP), the department undertook already a limited amount of historical
work codifying standard administrative procedures appertaining to, say, the
presentation of an ambassador’s letters of credence, the rupture of diplomatic
relations, or the evacuation of British nationals. Even so, members favoured
doing more on policy-related topics along the lines suggested by Robin Hooper’s
background paper, especially as diplomatic staﬀ were mobile and oﬃcial
memories short : ‘Looking back can be a salutary exercise. If we could spare the
time or the staﬀ we should probably derive great beneﬁt from examining in
retrospect the accuracy of the information on which policy was based and the
correctness of the conclusions drawn from it. ’27 As Hooper pointed out, ‘ there
may be issues … when past experience can be a useful guide to recurrent
problems. For example, the Persian oil crisis was a major trouble which may one
23 Gowing to Sir I. Bancroft, 7 June 1978, correspondence ﬁles, Bancroft 2, papers of Margaret
Gowing, Museum of History of Science, Oxford.
24 Brook to Professor W. K. Hancock, 19 Feb. 1958, NA, CAB103/562.
25 On the Treasury’s use of history, see my forthcoming monograph Using history, making British
policy : the Treasury and the Foreign Oﬃce, 1950–1976 (Basingstoke, 2006).
26 Minutes, 8th meeting, Steering Committee (SC), 1 Apr. 1958, NA, FO371/135611/ZP2/12G.
27 R. Hooper, head of PUS’s dept, n.d., SC(58) 20, NA, FO371/135611/ZP2/15G.
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day be followed by others suﬃciently similar to make its history relevant to their
handling ’. The committee’s support of the case for following up Brook’s proposal
led Hoyer Millar to commission Rohan Butler, the DBFP ’s senior editor, to
undertake a historical ‘pilot project ’.
Following a review, led by Cecil Parrott, the Director of Research and
Librarian, of subjects upon which ‘historical accounts might be useful in the
future ’, a shortlist – the seven topics included the 1950–3 Korean war, the 1951
Abadan crisis, and the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina – was placed before
the Steering Committee in February 1959.28 Looking back, the 1956 Suez aﬀair
seems a notable omission, but this was hardly surprising, given its continued high
sensitivity in both political and oﬃcial circles.29 In the event, the Abadan crisis,
described as involving ‘a complex concentration and critical balance of factors,
political, economic, juridical and military ’, was selected by the committee as
promising to yield ‘a particularly instructive case history’.30 Signiﬁcantly, this
topic, highlighted in Hooper’s background paper in 1958, was favoured also by
Butler himself because it promised to be ‘ important, revealing and not too
dispersed from point of view of treatment ’.31 The fact that the Steering
Committee devoted a large proportion of its time during 1958 to redeﬁning
British policy towards the Middle East reinforced the case for selecting Abadan,
especially as Selwyn Lloyd, the foreign secretary, devoted close attention to the
policy statement’s coverage of Iran.32
I V
In March 1962 Butler completed what had proved a challenging, often diﬃcult,
research study entitled ‘British policy in the relinquishment of Abadan in 1951 ’.33
The time taken to complete the project, though partly explained by its size,
reﬂected also the fact that Butler, a fellow of All Souls (1938–84) and sub-warden
between 1961 and 1963, worked only part time for the Foreign Oﬃce. The
history, totalling 324 pages, was rather long, but Butler argued that a more
concise approach would have reduced its utility by oversimplifying and distort-
ing complex issues relating to, say, the evaluation of alternative policy options
and decision-making.34 Nevertheless, an awareness of the pressures upon
busy policymakers led Butler to signpost key points through headers as well as
to codify the lessons in a sixteen-page concluding section cross-referenced to the
text.
Rejecting the use of interviews with participants in events because of time
pressures, Butler’s research relied heavily upon Foreign Oﬃce records
28 SC (59) 7, 12 Feb. 1959, NA, FO371/143694/ZP15/2.
29 Butler, 15 Feb. 1963, p. 2, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
30 R. W. Mason, 23 Nov. 1962, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3; Butler, Sept. 1962, p. 2, NA, FO370/
2694/LS18/3. 31 SC (59) 7, 12 Feb. 1959, NA, FO371/143694/ZP15/2.
32 Selwyn Lloyd to Hoyer Millar, 3 Nov. 1958, NA, FO371/135615/ZP2/40G.
33 Butler, Sept. 1962, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3. 34 Ibid., p. 2.
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supplemented by limited Cabinet Oﬃce ﬁles and Hansard.35 Even so, and
contrary to his initial expectations, some relevant departmental documentation
was withheld, prompting him ‘as a matter of historical principle, to disclaim in
advance all responsibility for all errors or omissions of fact or inference due to this
cause ’.36 The fact that his history glossed over intelligence issues, most notably
excluding any meaningful mention of the 1953 coup, indicates that intelligence
ﬁles came into this category. Nor was he allowed access to the records of other
departments, most notably the Treasury and the Ministry of Fuel and Power,
prominent in the Abadan crisis. Naturally, the archives of the AIOC, like those
belonging to the American, Iranian, and other governments, were also closed
to him.
Despite claiming to approach the topic like any other academic historian,
Butler acknowledged his functional role in giving practical eﬀect to Brook’s
‘expressed intentions ’.37 Recalling the assertion made by Sir Llewellyn
Woodward, the former senior editor of the DBFP, that ‘while history does not
repeat itself, historical situations do recur ’, Butler urged caution when using his
history, since hindsight rendered it easy to appear wise after the event.38 Account
had also to be taken of an ever-changing international context :
To attempt to reduce this to too rigid an exercise would, I fear, be unduly mechanistic and
unrealistic in view of the complexity of ever-shifting diplomatic problems, of their
particularly high political content by comparison with the work of most other Government
departments, and of the tiresome fact that diplomacy deals with foreigners not subject to
the authority of the Secretary of State.39
Butler’s lessons were numerous and often overlapped, but his principal
‘political ’ and ‘administrative ’ conclusions can be categorized under six
principal headers. First, the Abadan crisis revealed Britain’s relative weakness in
power, most notably its declining capacity for independent action and growing
dependence upon the USA.
One is left with the impression that if a mark of the greatest among great Powers be the
capacity to inﬂuence the government of smaller Powers by its extreme displeasure then, in
relation to Persia, that greatest Power, over against Russia, was now the United States
and no longer Great Britain as in the days of her recently relinquished Indian Empire.40
Iranian intransigence meant that ‘probably, as came to be recognised in the
Foreign Oﬃce, only British military force could at the last, have prevented
the abandonment of Abadan’.41 But the military option was repeatedly rejected.42
Throughout a fundamental lack of power in the region was paramount, but for
35 Ibid., p. 3. Butler exhibited a somewhat conservative attitude towards sources, but during the
early 1960s oral testimony represented an emerging form of historical evidence still being rediscovered
by historians: Butler, 18 Oct. 1966, FO370/2906/LS13; Paul Thompson, The voice of the past : oral history
(2nd edn, Oxford, 1988), pp. 72–81. 36 Butler, Sept. 1962, p. 3, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
37 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 38 Ibid., p. 2. 39 Ibid., p. 3. 40 Ibid., p. 304. 41 Ibid., p. 313.
42 See Speller, ‘ ‘‘Splutter of musketry?’’ ’, pp. 60–2; Cable, Intervention at Abadan, pp. 95–123.
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Attlee perceived American opposition to the use of force reinforced the case for
restraint. Certainly, the ‘eﬀective lack of American support for British
policy … underlay the whole development of the crisis in 1951 and facilitated
the Persian game of playing Great Britain oﬀ against the United States ’.43 The
Korean war, reinforcing Washington’s tendency to view Iran primarily as a
potential Cold War ally, ensured that the British government was ‘more
immediately inﬂuenced by pressure from the American government ’ to appease,
not oppose, Iran.44
Secondly, the failure to use force, compounded by the evacuation of Abadan,
undermined images of British power and prestige in general and in the Middle
East in particular. Quoting from Eden’s recently published memoirs to the eﬀect
that ‘ the troubles fomented on the Shatt al Arab, festered on the Nile ’, Butler
concluded that ‘The gravest and most prompt repercussion of the British eviction
from Abadan occurred in Egypt with special signiﬁcance for the British position
on the Suez Canal. ’45 Within days of leaving Abadan, the British government was
confronted by Egypt’s denunciation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty as well
as serious unrest in the canal zone.46 Thirdly, despite rejecting force, policy-
makers failed nonetheless either to adjust to Britain’s ‘changed circumstances ’ or
to exploit its vital role in the Cold War:
It may be that in 1950–51 the background of British power and prestige (e.g. Second World
War, Indian Empire) was too close to permit a full adjustment to changed circumstances
wherein Great Britain might need to reinforce her position of strength in relation to lesser
Powers such as Persia by exploiting the techniques of bargaining from weakness with
greater Powers such as the United States. Hence, perhaps, the impression sometimes that
British policy regarding Persia was at once too rigid and too weak.47
From this perspective, Washington’s Cold War preoccupations should have been
used as leverage to ensure that American pressure was exerted upon Iran, not
Britain, to do the appeasing.
Fourthly, these problems reﬂected the shortcomings of policymakers, most
notably in failing to decide upon a feasible and eﬀective strategy. Far from
adopting a strong proactive course, British policymakers allowed the Iranian
government to set the agenda so that ‘British policy often seemed to be waiting
upon, or catching up with, Persian propulsion of events. ’48 The ‘precarious ’
situation confronting the Attlee government in September 1951, when only
the ‘extreme alternatives ’ of withdrawal from Abadan or the eviction of
Mossadegh remained, highlighted the ‘bankruptcy’ of British policy, even if
Butler accepted that normally it was preferable to make no agreement than to
make a bad one.49 For Butler, drift proved a function of the Labour government’s
43 Butler, Sept. 1962, p. 318, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3. 44 Ibid., p. 309. 45 Ibid., pp. 291, 307;
Anthony Eden, The memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden : full circle (London, 1960), p. 195; Michael T. Thornhill,
‘Britain and the Egyptian question, 1950–1952’ (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1995), pp. 39–41, p. 136.
46 Times, 9 Oct. 1951. 47 Butler, Sept. 1962, p. 309, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
48 Ibid., p. 312. 49 Ibid., p. 307.
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small parliamentary majority ; the lengthy illness of Ernest Bevin, the foreign
secretary (1945–51) ; the inadequacies of his successor, Herbert Morrison; the
contrasting perspectives adopted by the Treasury, Ministry of Fuel and Power,
and the Foreign Oﬃce; and the lack of support from Washington. Even worse,
the British government showed itself incapable of responding eﬀectively to
the nationalist challenge emerging in Iran, let alone dealing with political leaders
like Mossadegh, ‘a demagogic xenophobe and fanatical eccentric ’ skilled at both
mobilizing popular support and playing upon the USA’s Cold War fears.50
Fifthly, the British failure to consider in advance a range of alternative strategies
in the event of the AIOC’s nationalization exposed a range of methodological
shortcomings, most notably a fundamental lack of intelligence, research, forward
thinking, and contingency planning. For Butler, the Teheran embassy’s lack of
reliable local contacts, fragmentary grasp of the Iranian nationalist movement,
and diﬃcult relationship with its American counterpart meant that policymakers
were handicapped by an inadequate information base upon which to make
decisions. This failing was compounded during the actual crisis when ‘action
under pressure ’ and ‘the endless rustle of the in-tray’ allowed oﬃcials ‘ little or no
time for philosophic brooding upon the heavy issues ’ or to look ‘back to historical
precedents and warnings or forward to the remoter but in the long run possibly
more important implications and consequences of immediate action’.51 Hence
the micawberite tendency to muddle through, not control, the crisis. Finally,
the fast-moving nature of events revealed the merits of procedural improvements,
like placing the department on ‘crisis alert ’ in order to prioritize important
and urgent communications. Reportedly, one dispatch, sent by the British
ambassador in Teheran on 31 December 1950 and received in the Foreign
Oﬃce on 4 January 1951, was not seen by the head of the Eastern department
until 24 January !
V
Notwithstanding the fact that only one hundred copies were printed for ‘conﬁ-
dential oﬃcial use ’ within the Foreign Oﬃce and by selected overseas missions,
Butler’s secret history exerted a far from insubstantial impact upon policymakers.
Revisiting the 1950s prompted several readers to go beyond the Anglo-Iranian
past to reappraise Britain’s current international position alongside future courses
of action adjudged capable of enabling Britain – to quote Butler – ‘ to regain
a larger measure of initiative in her foreign policy ’.52 Commentaries, drawing
frequently upon personal memories of the actual crisis, reﬂected also a growing
appreciation of the ‘great shift of power ’ in the Middle East during the past
decade. Recalling his posting at Teheran during the late 1950s, Frederick Mason,
head of the Economic Relations department, minuted that ‘ the whole story is full
50 Ibid., p. 314. 51 Ibid., pp. 319–21. 52 Ibid., p. 308.
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of the lesson that Her Majesty’s Government can no longer act on their own in major matters
of this kind ’ (author’s emphasis) :
If anyone ever doubted the paralysing eﬀect which United States actions had on the
negotiations, this history is there to dispel such doubts. Again and again our actions
were frustrated by American warnings, threats and above all by their day to day inter-
ference and attempts to mediate or inﬂuence one side or the other.53
Impressed by the memorandum’s value in illuminating contemporary realities
and oﬀering meaningful discussion points for policymakers, Harold Caccia,
Hoyer Millar’s successor as PUS, asked Lord Strang, who had served as PUS
(1949–53) during the Abadan dispute, to review Butler’s history and ‘draw what
lessons he can both as to the conduct of aﬀairs in the circumstances of the time,
and as to the possible bearing of these lessons upon the conduct of aﬀairs in the
circumstances of today ’.54 Signiﬁcantly, Caccia forwarded Butler’s concluding
section to Lord Home, the foreign secretary (1960–3), who found the lessons a
‘very interesting ’ read. Undoubtedly, his attentiveness – Home, trusting that ‘we
are better geared to an emergency now’, indicated his willingness to discuss
any issues raised therein – reﬂected also his recent involvement in the Cuban
missiles crisis, and particularly his active role in publicly articulating the lessons
thereof.55 Following Home’s comments, Caccia asked Strang to investigate also
the case for any special administrative preparations.56
In February 1963 Strang submitted an informed and thoughtful commentary,
supplemented by numerous marginal notes, on what he described as Butler’s
‘ instructive case history’.57 Indeed, his handwritten commentary amounted to
sixty-four pages, or forty-four pages when typed up! Despite his preparedness to
identify lessons viewed ‘ in the circumstances of the time’, Strang confessed diﬃ-
dence about articulating their present-day relevance because of changes in both
international relations and Foreign Oﬃce practice since his retirement. Strang
admitted also he had a personal case to answer in the sense that the Abadan crisis
was only one of a number of questions requiring his attention as PUS; thus, from
May 1951 he conceded that his prime focus was the defection of Burgess and
Maclean to the Soviet Union as well as the Korean war, not the Abadan crisis.58
On the whole, Strang found Butler’s conclusions somewhat lengthy and
written a ‘shade pedantically ’, but basically sound, excepting an occasional
53 F. C. Mason, 24 Apr. 1962, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
54 Strang, n.d. (4 Feb. 1963), NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3. This comment is also in STRN2/10. Lord
Strang’s papers (STRN), located at the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (CAC), are quoted by
kind permission of the Churchill Archives Centre.
55 Home, 4 Jan. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3; D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London, 1996),
pp. 245–9. 56 Caccia, 17 Dec. 1962, 7 Jan. 1963; Home, n.d. ( Jan. 1963), NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
57 Strang, n.d. (4 Feb. 1963), NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3. ‘Personal ’ comments in paragraphs 14–23,
formerly extracted from FO370/2694, have now been re-inserted separately. They are also in CAC,
STRN2/10. Signiﬁcantly, his commentary glossed over Britain’s role in the 1953 coup: Louis, ‘Britain
and the overthrow of Mosaddeq’, p. 176.
58 Strang, n.d. (4 Feb. 1963), paras. 20–2, CAC, STRN2/10.
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problem of interpretation: ‘Butler is hard to satisfy. If Persian proposals are
accepted, this is a retreat. If they are rejected, this is a failure to negotiate. If we
consult the Americans, we are waﬄing; if we do not, we are reckless. ’59 Looking
back, he recalled that Britain’s failure to pursue ‘an adroit and purposeful
diplomacy’ towards Iran largely reﬂected ‘ the lack of strong ministerial direction
at the highest level ’, since the problems consequent upon Bevin’s ill-health were
compounded by Morrison’s inexperience of foreign aﬀairs and relative lack
of ministerial authority. As a result, as Strang recorded, the prime minister
settled policy : ‘ In Mr. Attlee’s mind, that course meant retreat rather than
resort to force. ’ Strang, who conceded that his thinking was not unaﬀected by the
recent Cuban missiles crisis, minuted that the key lesson centred upon the fact that
‘US not UK the Great Power’, so that ‘The whole Abadan crisis bedevilled
by US theory about Russia. ’60 Like Butler, he complained that in 1951 the
British government failed to ‘ face America with grave consequences of breach
between us ’ caused by Washington’s cultivation of Iran as a potential Cold
War ally.61
Reviewing the past encouraged Strang also to look forward in order to
advocate the serious re-think of both policy and methods adjudged necessary
to enable Britain to play ‘ the active game of diplomacy’ more eﬀectively.62
Building upon Butler’s critique of the ‘ temper ’ in which diplomacy had been
conducted in 1951, Strang developed arguments outlined already in both his
recent book entitled Britain in world aﬀairs (1961) – here, he compared the ‘quiet
tradition ’ of Castlereagh, Salisbury, and Grey with the ‘rumbustious tradition’
associated with Canning and Palmerston – and oral evidence given in January
1963 to the Plowden Committee on representative services overseas.63 The
perceived failure of a ‘quiet ’ diplomatic strategy in the Abadan crisis, viewed
alongside indicators of declining power, imperial retreat, and the fact that ‘you
can never be sure of complete US support ’, led Strang to speculate whether ‘we
cannot bring about a revolution in our international outlook and procedures ’ to
‘give our diplomacy a new look’.64 Pointing to de Gaulle’s selﬁsh independent
course, he presented France as a possible role model. The alternative – Strang
feared ‘ international impotence’ – was unwelcome, even unacceptable.
Having already been shown Butler’s conclusions, Lord Home found Strang’s
commentary a stimulating read:
I am particularly interested in paragraph 73 to the end. Are we a bit too altruistic in our
foreign policy? We could reach a point when we are so careful to appease this or that
interest that we have no recognisable line of our own and have no identity. That would
mean that we would lose inﬂuence and authority and command no function in our own
59 Ibid., para. 64, p. 41. 60 Ibid., pp. 30, 51. 61 Ibid., para. 69. 62 Ibid., para. 75.
63 Lord Strang, Britain in world aﬀairs : a survey of ﬂuctuations in British power and inﬂuence, Henry VIII
to Elizabeth II (London, 1961), pp. 38, 108–10, 304; Strang, 28 Jan. 1963, CAC, STRN2/11, pp. 5–8.
64 Strang, n.d. (4 Feb. 1963), para. 75, p. 33, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
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right. I would like you to give some thought to this danger of ‘ international impotence ’,
paragraph 75.65
The foreign secretary’s positive response, alongside the government’s perceived
need to consider alternative policy options in the wake of Britain’s recent failure
to join the Common Market ( January 1963), led Caccia to reproduce the para-
graph attracting Home’s attention in his recently introduced monthly letter
to heads of mission: ‘While we are re-considering our methods rather than our
long-term objectives, I would ask you to consider a thought which has been
recently put to me by Lord Strang. ’66 Strang’s paragraph 75 followed:
Would it be possible to give our diplomacy a new look? The example is here before our
eyes. The French have traditionally employed a highly eﬃcient diplomacy for self-
regarding national ends. Unlike ourselves, they have not as a rule thought it to their long-
term advantage to cast their bread upon the waters by taking account of the general
interest side by side with the national interest. Can we any longer aﬀord, indeed do we now
need, to be to this extent altruistic? President de Gaulle has shown how a European Power,
alliance or no alliance, can follow an independent, nationally-based policy, paying scant
regard to the interests of others. France has shown how to exploit the advantages of the
weaker party. As M. Massigli is reliably reported once to have said : ‘France, though no
longer so powerful as of old, has always a stopping card to play in the game of diplomacy. ’
She can, and does, make the most of her nuisance value. Having no eﬀective parliamentary
check, and little public sentiment in favour of the United Nations, and a deep scepticism
about the reliability of the United States and the eﬀectiveness of NATO, she can follow
courses on a number of international issues which one would say are not open to any British
Government in the face of prevailing Parliamentary and public opinion. And yet, unless
we break free from these shackles, may we not be condemned to relative international
impotence? Is it not time, as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick once asked, for us to force someone to
appease us for a change? If we cannot bring about a revolution in our international outlook
and procedures, can we not at least make a modest start? We have a Foreign Secretary
today who, more than any of his recent predecessors, has the necessary qualities. And
might we not, in our training, try to instil into our new recruits some insight into the active
game of diplomacy, as the French have shown that it can still be played?
No indication was given of what actually prompted Strang’s speculations ;
indeed, most respondents thought mistakenly that he was reacting to the abortive
Common Market talks. As a result, Caccia used his next monthly letter to disclose
the actual source in a manner merely acknowledging the existence, not the
contents, of Butler’s Abadan history. More importantly, Caccia took the
opportunity to place upon record what he saw as the contemporary relevance of
the lessons of the Abadan dispute.
Then [i.e. 1951], in the main, we employed an accommodating diplomacy in an ugly and
most diﬃcult situation, with results that were far from wholly satisfactory, even though we
ultimately salvaged a large amount economically by the consortium agreement of 1954.
65 Qu. Caccia to Strang, 7 Feb. 1963, CAC, STRN2/10.
66 Caccia, 1 Feb. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
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The defence of our stake in Persian oil in 1951 was severely handicapped by the fact, among
others, that for the Americans it was rather too readily subordinated to their fear of pro-
voking Russian intervention and to their calculation that in order to obviate that danger it
was desirable to appease, not us, but the weaker Persians. The latter surpassed themselves
in techniques of bargaining from relative weakness, techniques which only the very strong
can aﬀord to neglect all the time. Such instances are worth recalling, even while they
clearly need to be balanced against those more familiar ones e.g. from the Suez Crisis
the dangers inherent in any attempt to go it nearly alone: a situation, indeed, which all
diplomacy so far as possible must surely try to prevent.67
Prompted by Strang’s praise for Gaullist vigour in promoting French interests,
Caccia speculated whether Britain was ‘ too apt … to do the giving and leave the
taking to others ’?
V I
Strang’s thoughts struck a chord, as evidenced by the thirty-plus responses
received from overseas missions. Naturally, his views did not always win support,
but, like Butler, most respondents took the opportunity to express concern about
both British policy and methods. Revealingly, many experienced diﬃculty in
ﬁnding an appropriate agreed descriptor for Britain’s current status. Was Britain,
though no longer a major power ‘ in the sense that we once were and the
Americans and Russians now are ’ (Patrick Dean, UN), still ‘a world-wide power ’
(Dean), a ‘ leading European nation ’ (Lord Robert Hankey, OECD, Paris)
or merely ‘a declining power ’ of ‘one and a halfth rate importance’ (Paul Gore-
Booth, New Delhi)?68 Within this context, Sir Geoﬀrey Wallinger (Rio de Janeiro)
oﬀered perhaps the most vivid description of Britain’s fundamental dilemma:
‘Our diﬃculties seem to have turned us into the rather muscle-bound policeman
of the Western world … primarily engaged in the somewhat negative task of
trying to stop the fast-moving traﬃc all about us from getting out of hand’.69
Prompted by Caccia’s reference to the Abadan crisis, Gore-Booth oﬀered a
‘ footnote ’ to Butler’s history. For Gore-Booth, the Abadan crisis established that
Britain was ‘a declining power’ preoccupied with packing up an empire : ‘our
problem is to learn how to behave like a smaller power than we were, while
retaining those of the qualities of an ex-great power which are relevant and
discarding those which are not ’.70
Several respondents advocated updating British diplomacy through sharper
thinking and plainer speaking; indeed, there was widespread support for the
adoption of a ‘greater ruthlessness in discarding inherited axioms and sentiments ’
(John Maud, Cape Town) by way of moving on from the usual nostalgia about
67 Caccia, 1 Mar. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
68 Hankey to Caccia, 8 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/2/i; Gore-Booth to Caccia, 30 Apr.
1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4n; Dean to Caccia, 16 Mar. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4j.
69 Wallinger to Caccia, 22 Mar. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4k.
70 Gore-Booth to Caccia, 30 Apr. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4n.
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‘ the old spacious days ’ (Sir Roderick Parkes, Amman).71 Even so, most expressed
reservations about emulating the French model because of marked diﬀerences
between the two countries arising from France’s greater economic self-suﬃciency
and continental location. In any case, as Dean observed, de Gaulle, who was
subject to ‘no eﬀective parliamentary check’, had ‘no conscience about the
United Nations ’.72
Generally speaking, respondents displayed a keen, indeed revealing, appreci-
ation of perceived constraints hindering Britain’s conduct of diplomacy in a more
positive, dexterous, and ﬂexible manner than had happened during and after
the Abadan crisis. Britain’s economic shortcomings proved a perennial theme.
None felt able to minimize the economic drags on policy ; indeed, as Wallinger
observed, ‘diplomacy by itself … cannot make a great power out of an economic
question mark’.73 Failure at Suez was often cited as casting a long shadow over
policymakers, most notably by prompting an awareness of the limitations upon
British power and discouraging strong independent action. For Hankey, the Suez
precedent undermined Strang’s case for ‘going it alone’ : ‘we saw in 1956 that we
could not do this eﬀectively even in association with France, and even against
the Egyptians ’.74 At the same time, the Suez failure led countervailing evidence to
be ignored; indeed, only one respondent mentioned Britain’s armed intervention
at Kuwait in 1961.75 Several responses betrayed continuing oﬃcial sensitivities
about Suez; in fact, Maud questioned whether this episode, when ‘diplomacy was
short circuited’ by Eden, warranted description as a diplomatic failure.76
V I I
In this manner, the commentaries and exchanges prompted by the Abadan
history – these occurred soon after Dean Acheson’s infamous remark in
December 1962 about Britain’s loss of empire and failure to ﬁnd a new role – fed
into and complemented ongoing reviews (e.g. Cabinet Future Planning
working group, 1962–4; the Plowden Committee’s study of representative services
overseas) conducted by ministers and oﬃcials about the future course and
methods of British foreign policy.77 In particular, Butler’s history encouraged
71 Maud to Caccia, 8 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/2h; Parkes to Caccia, 22 Feb. 1963,
NA, FO371/173334/WP30/3k. 72 Dean to Caccia, 16 Mar. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4j.
73 Wallinger to Caccia, 22 Mar. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/4k.
74 Hankey to Caccia, 8 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/2i.
75 George Vaughan, Panama, to Caccia, 14 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/3d. Sub-
sequently, lingering anti-British sentiment qualiﬁed initial impressions of success : Nigel Ashton,
‘Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9 (1998), pp. 163–81; Wm. Roger Louis,
‘The British withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967–1971’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31
(2003), pp. 83–102, at p. 91 ; Simon Smith, Britain’s revival and fall in the Gulf : Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the
Trucial States, 1950–1971 (London, 2004), pp. 119–28.
76 Maud to Caccia, 8 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/2h.
77 Saki Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from east of Suez : the choice between Europe and the world? (Basingstoke,
2002), pp. 24–42; Peter Mangold, Success and failure in British foreign policy : evaluating the record, 1900–2000
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a greater oﬃcial preparedness to consider new directions based upon a more
realistic assessment of recent trends. Encouraged by the ‘stimulating, if critical ’
range of views, Caccia instructed Butler to codify responses by way of guiding the
Steering Committee’s future discussions about giving British diplomacy a ‘new
and more enterprising look’.78
Once again, a substantial part of the resulting memorandum, entitled ‘A new
perspective for British diplomacy’, was circulated both within the department
and to overseas missions as part of the ongoing exchanges about alternative ways
forward – to quote the concluding header – ‘Towards a revived diplomacy for
Britain ’ enabling the foreign secretary to lead ‘a modern Britain in a modern
world ’.79 The text was sent also to Edward Heath, the lord privy seal, who was
currently commissioning David Thomson to produce a history of Gaullism.80
The ‘new perspective ’ memorandum in which Butler described Britain as ‘a
somewhat impotent middleweight ’ power proved the basis for discussion at two
meetings of the Steering Committee, held on 30 July and 23 August 1963, with
Butler being invited to attend upon the second occasion to guide members.81
In the event, the committee, eschewing a point-by-point focus upon Butler’s
conclusions, gravitated towards more practical issues, like overseas representation
and planning, being actioned already through the Plowden Committee (1962–4)
and the Foreign Oﬃce’s planning staﬀ.82
Sir John Nicholls, a deputy under-secretary of state, minuted that over time
broader policy issues raised by Butler’s papers would be taken into account by the
Foreign Oﬃce, most notably through the work of the Steering Committee and
planning staﬀ.83 Indeed, within weeks of taking over in January 1964 as head of
the restructured planning staﬀ, Michael Palliser acknowledged that Butler’s
Abadan history and subsequent memoranda, alongside ‘ the ideas generated as a
result of the numerous letters sent last year by Heads of Mission have been to
some extent responsible for the ‘‘new look’’ that we are now trying to give to our
planning arrangements ’ : ‘ I think it is fair to say that the present experiment is
designed to give Planning greater punch and precision and I hope we shall
therefore meet many of the criticisms made in Butler’s paper. ’84
(Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 13, 121–4. Pointing to its ‘ folly ’ and ‘persistent stupidity’, Acheson, the US
secretary of state (1949–53), proved highly critical of British policy over Abadan: Dean Acheson, Present
at the creation : my years in the State department (London, 1970), pp. 501, 506.
78 Caccia, 1 Mar. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
79 Butler, 24 May 1963, para. 52, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
80 Caccia, 29 May 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/1; Woodﬁeld, 13 May 1964, NA, PREM11/
4808. See David Thomson, ‘Gaullism’s point of reappraisal ’, Times, 22 Aug. 1963.
81 Minutes, 39th, 41st meetings of Steering Committee, 30 July 1963, 23 Aug. 1963, NA, FO371/
173334/WP30/8.
82 Butler, 24 May 1963, paras. 51–2, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3; Ernest Barnes, 4 Oct. 1963, NA,
FO371/173334/WP30/8; Oﬃce Circular, no. 27 : reorganisation of planning work in the Foreign
Oﬃce, 30 Dec. 1963, NA, FO371/178812/PLA1/1.
83 B. Burrows, 10 Oct. 1963, Nicholls, 14 Oct. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/8.
84 Palliser to John Peck, Dakar, 6 Feb. 1964, NA, FO371/178812/PLA1/4.
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In any case, radically changing direction, as opposed to gradually readjusting
course, was a complex and time-consuming operation requiring a fundamental
transformation in the mindsets of oﬃcials and ministers. After all, the latter were
still beginning to address seriously the case for a major shift in both foreign policy
and methods. What these exchanges had done was to carry forward, at least at
the oﬃcial level, the process of diagnosis and prognosis about Britain’s role in a
rapidly changing world, particularly regarding Europe, the Middle East, the
empire, the USA, and the Soviet Union. In this sense, they were part of what Saki
Dockrill described as the ‘ incremental ’ series of twists and turns culminating
during the late 1960s in the landmark decision to withdraw from east of Suez.85
The genuine interest shown by Home and Heath in Butler’s lessons indicated that
the Abadan history exerted signiﬁcant impacts also at the political level ; indeed,
in October 1963 Heath speciﬁcally asked to be kept apprized of any follow-up to
Butler’s ‘new perspective ’ paper, but within days was moved to the Board of
Trade in Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s new government.86
V I I I
Butler’s history also reached the desk of Michael Stewart, when foreign secretary
(1965–6) in the 1964–70 Wilson government. Impressed by this ‘ interesting ’
study, Stewart suggested that Butler should undertake a conﬁdential history of
the 1956 Suez crisis for which ‘The Abadan report would be the pattern and
precedent ’ : ‘ I think that just as we have learned some useful lessons from
Abadan, so something worthwhile could emerge from a study of Suez. ’87 Quite
apart from appreciating the value of learning from the past, Stewart was giving
eﬀect also to the perennial demands of Labour MPs, as pressed through repeated
parliamentary questions, for an oﬃcial history of what was seen as the
Conservative party’s Achilles heel.
Stewart’s proposal alarmed oﬃcials, who feared that any Suez history would
open up a veritable Pandora’s box by highlighting the failure of politicians to
consider, let alone follow, oﬃcial advice.88 For Gore-Booth, Caccia’s successor as
PUS:
The lesson to be learned from Suez was a simple one. It was this : if Ministers consulted
their oﬃcials and then rejected their advice this was perfectly proper and might on many
occasions give the right answer. If, however, a government undertook operations by a
process of deliberately refraining from taking oﬃcial advice, or keeping oﬃcials informed,
then the result would in due course be disastrous.89
85 Dockrill, Britain’s retreat, pp. 209–26; Louis, ‘British withdrawal’, pp. 83–102; Smith, Britain’s
revival, pp. 1–6, 151–6. 86 Heath, 15 Oct. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/8.
87 Stewart to Gore-Booth, 5 July 1965, NA, FO370/2807/LS13/4.
88 N. Henderson, n.d. (July 1965), NA, FO370/2807/LS13/4.
89 Gore-Booth, 13 July 1965, NA, FO370/2807/LS13/4; Paul Gore-Booth, With great truth and
respect (London, 1974), p. 230.
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Pointing to the topic’s political sensitivity and the fact that a departmental review
indicated that the records ‘ thin out ’ after nationalization – reportedly, there
existed ‘no conﬁdential evidence in the Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcial archives at all ’
documenting the crucial events leading up to hostilities – Gore-Booth sought
to dissuade Stewart from pressing the matter.90 In this instance, oﬃcial advice
prevailed. Stewart backed down, at least ‘ for the present ’.
In fact, unknown to Stewart, there existed already a 1957 Foreign Oﬃce study
of the lessons of Suez prepared at Eden’s request by his private secretary, Guy
Millard.91 Signiﬁcantly, Eden, though accepting the need to strengthen Britain’s
economic base and to scale down existing military commitments, still opined that
post-Suez Britain was capable of playing ‘an independent part in the world ’.
Unsurprisingly, Millard’s account, albeit conﬁned to Britain’s relations with
France, the USA, and the United Nations, identiﬁed many of the themes devel-
oped a few years later by Butler’s history, most notably ‘ the limitations of our
strength’ and the way in which the capacity to act independently was circum-
scribed by economic weakness.92 Of particular interest were the links drawn by
Millard between the Abadan and Suez disputes, including the way in which
‘strong memories of Abadan’ were presented as inﬂuencing both British and
Egyptian policymakers in 1956. Thus, he saw Iran’s example as reinforcing
Egypt’s ‘ intense nationalism’ by demonstrating that ‘ the ‘‘ imperialist ’’ Powers
could successfully be deﬁed’. Conversely, concern about the resulting damage to
British interests and prestige in the Middle East was presented as a ‘ strong’
inﬂuence determining the nature of the British response : ‘Successive retreats in
Asia and the Middle East had made further retreats increasingly
repugnant … An earlier crisis had left strong memories of Abadan. Their lesson
seemed to be that in the defence of important British interests it is sometimes
necessary to take risks. ’93
I X
Following the arrest of eight British servicemen on the Shatt-al-Arab waterway
for allegedly entering Iran’s territorial waters in June 2004, Jack Straw, the British
foreign secretary, drew upon history to explain to BBC radio listeners the prob-
lematic course of Anglo-Iranian relations.94
Part of the problem that we have in terms of our relations with Iran go back to our
domination of that region. We had been instrumental in putting the Shah’s father on the
throne and many aspects of the Shah’s regime were brutal, repressive, sought to strike out
90 This claim should be viewed alongside reports that relevant material, including the British copy
of the Treaty of Se`vres, was destroyed: Avi Shlaim, ‘The protocol of Se`vres, 1956: anatomy of a war
plot ’, International Aﬀairs, 73 (1997), pp. 509–30, at p. 509.
91 Qu. F. Bishop to Laskey, 28 Dec. 1956, NA, PREM11/1138.
92 Millard, Aug. 1957, pp.1–2, 29, NA, FO800/728. 93 Ibid., pp. 1–2.
94 ‘World at one’, BBC Radio Four, 4 July 2004.
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Iran’s past and also its Islamic heritage and its Islamic beliefs. So those things are associated
in many Iranians ’ minds with the United Kingdom.
Straw’s references to the Iranian past, demonstrating the preparedness of
policymakers to use history’s present-day rhetorical value in presenting foreign
policy, possessed added meaning given Britain’s recent role in the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Within this context, Butler’s Abadan history oﬀered an illuminating case study
piloting Brook’s 1957 ‘ funding experience’ initiative. Writing from Prague,
Parrott, who had helped Butler set up the project, urged the institutionalization of
what he saw as a ‘ fascinating’ and worthwhile activity.95 Likewise, George
Vaughan (Panama) welcomed Butler’s history as emphasizing the ‘ lessons for us,
as diplomats, in what has happened … First, which ought not to need repeating,
is how important is a knowledge of history, if blunders and pitfalls are to be
avoided. ’96 In this vein, Butler’s obituary in The Times, albeit inﬂuenced by his
subsequent appointment in May 1963 as special historical adviser to the foreign
secretary (1963–82), claimed that ‘Among the special studies that he made, his
analysis of the lessons to be learnt from the Abadan crisis of 1951 permanently
inﬂuenced Foreign Oﬃce thinking. ’97 Perhaps, this rather over-stated the impact
of his Abadan history, but what had been supported by the Foreign Oﬃce as
a ‘pilot project ’ seemed worthy of emulation, even if such histories would not
always prove as timely nor possess a similar wide-ranging utility. Inevitably, the
principal inﬂuence was exerted upon oﬃcials, but the interest shown by Home,
Heath, and Stewart established that the history impacted directly upon
ministerial thinking across party without having to be ﬁltered upwards through
oﬃcials.
Despite presenting himself as an academic ‘outsider looking inwards at the
problems confronting British diplomacy today ’, Butler found it diﬃcult to avoid
acknowledging that in reality he was acting as an oﬃcial historian enjoying
privileged access to departmental records.98 Conceding the functional nature of
his brief – his principal task was not so much to record what happened, when,
and why, but to use the historical narrative for drawing out lessons about policies
and methods for policymakers – Butler hoped that his history would make ‘a
small but constructive contribution towards strengthening British foreign policy
for the great tasks and great opportunities which now lie ahead’.99 Looking back
from 1962, it seemed natural for Butler to view the Abadan and Suez crises as
‘contrasting yet largely complementary’ elements in Britain’s withdrawal – for
some, this meant ‘ scuttle ’ – from the Middle East.100 This retreat gathered pace
95 Parrott to Caccia, 22 Feb. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
96 Vaughan to Caccia, 14 Feb. 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/3d.
97 Times, 14 Nov. 1996; Caccia, 1 May 1963, NA, LCO27/21.
98 Butler, 24 May 1963, para. 3, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
99 Butler to R. Mason, 9 March 1962, Butler, 15 Feb. 1963, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
100 Butler, Sept. 1962, p. 308, NA, FO370/2694/LS18/3.
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in 1956, when Nasser’s action led parallels to be drawn with not only Hitler and
Mussolini but also Mossadegh. Abadan was easily viewed as a dress rehearsal for
1956, even if the Suez crisis ’ cataclysmic and divisive nature soon caused oﬃcials
and politicians, among others, to gloss over, even forget, what had happened in
Iran a few years earlier.
Certainly, the Suez debacle, in which Nasser posed a more demanding
challenge than Mossadegh, demonstrated vividly that Eden – he looked back to
the 1930s rather than 1951 – had learned little from Abadan. Of course, in 1956
the lessons of the Abadan dispute had yet to be codiﬁed formally in the way
undertaken by Butler, but in August 1951, that is at the height of the crisis and a
few months before Eden returned to the Foreign Oﬃce in Churchill’s 1951–5
government, Sir Roger Makins, a deputy under-secretary, drafted what Strang,
then the PUS, described as a ‘brilliant and sound’ appraisal of the fundamental
principles underpinning British foreign policy.101 In particular, Makins
recognized the growing pressures upon British power consequent upon economic
underperformance, the emerging nationalist challenge, and the fact that the USA
was ‘an awkward ally ’. Nor was the ongoing Abadan dispute helping Britain’s
standing in the Middle East : ‘The dispute with Persia has dealt a heavy blow to
our prestige … We cannot aﬀord another mistake of this magnitude. ’ From this
perspective, the key lesson of the Abadan question was clear, that is, ‘we now
need American support to keep our end up in this area ’, and particularly ‘ to
maintain our position as a great Power ’.
For Donald Cameron Watt, the chief lesson of Suez ‘was largely to discredit
the conduct of foreign policy by the light of historical analogy in Britain’.102
Nevertheless, politicians, oﬃcials, and journalists have continued to use analogues
to frame present-day debates. Nor did Suez deter either Brook from launching
his ‘ funding experience’ initiative one year later or the Foreign Oﬃce from
commissioning during 1958–9 the Abadan study to investigate history’s policy
potential. As discussed above, it proves diﬃcult to treat Butler’s pilot study as
having a clear-cut outcome; indeed, neither Steiner nor Neustadt and May an-
ticipated more than marginal improvements in policymakers’ behaviour to result
from incorporating history more formally into the policy process.103 Rather
the Abadan history, including related documentation, fed into, guided, and in-
ﬂuenced ongoing discussions and reviews within Whitehall by juxtaposing the
lessons of history, contemporary realities, and possible new directions for both
foreign policy and methods.
However, this episode, though casting light upon history’s utility as a policy
input, demonstrated also the need for caution. Admittedly the lessons resulted
101 R. Makins, 11 Aug. 1951, Strang, 11 Aug. 1951, NA, FO371/124968/ZP24/2.
102 D. C. Watt, ‘ Introduction’, in J. T. Emmerson, The Rhineland crisis 7 March 1936: a study in
multilateral diplomacy (London, 1977), p. 13.
103 Steiner, ‘The historian’, p. 45 ; Steiner, ‘On writing’, p. 546; Neustadt and May, Thinking in time,
pp. 233–72.
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from in-depth research referenced back to the actual events, but they were – to
quote Butler – ‘historical conclusions ’ applicable to the political, economic,
military, and administrative context of the early 1950s.104 As Strang noted, the
domestic and international context was changed, even transformed, during
the next decade, and hence the contemporary relevance and application of
Butler’s lessons was rarely obvious and largely a matter for conjecture upon the
part of policymakers.
A few years earlier, when reviewing Eden’s Suez memoirs stressing the lessons
of the 1930s, Strang had pointed already to the central problem of learning from
history: ‘The question that will be long debated is whether the analogy with the
1930s was a true one, and how far it is wise in any event to shape a course of
action upon an analogy from history. ’105 In this vein, the Abadan history raised
several questions, albeit without necessarily providing the answers, about history’s
policy potential. How useful for policy purposes is a 324-page history which takes
years, not days, to complete? Is even a sixteen-page summary of key lessons too
lengthy for policymakers to use easily during a fast-moving crisis? To what extent
is the utility of lessons a function of the quality of a history’s research base? Is the
history of a topic, involving several Whitehall departments but based principally
upon Foreign Oﬃce documentation, a useful policy resource? Or does this give
a more realistic indication of the situation facing Foreign Oﬃce policymakers,
who unlike historians are unable to consult the ﬁles of other departments and
governments? How far should such internal histories make use of oral testimony?
Should the identiﬁcation of a history’s lessons be undertaken by historians or
oﬃcials? Is there a serious problem in writing a history, as in this case, a decade
or so after the event, when the improved sense of historical perspective is qualiﬁed
by the dangers of hindsight and ﬁltering lessons through subsequent events?
Finally, the episode raises questions about the ability of history to challenge,
even to transform over time, the ‘unspoken assumptions ’ moulding the
world view of a foreign policymaking elite imprisoned by traditional structural,
ideological, and other factors.106 As Strang pointed out in paragraph 75 of his
commentary on Butler’s history, the rapid pace of events repeatedly challenged
conventional ways of thinking about Britain’s role in the world, particularly
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regarding continental Europe, the USA, and smaller powers, like Egypt and Iran.
From this perspective, Abadan-type histories, using the historical narrative
to yield lessons based upon past experience, appeared potentially capable of
informing policymaking, but only if read, digested, and fed into the process. If
nothing else, Butler’s history encouraged busy policymakers snowed under with
urgent paperwork to ﬁnd time to comprehend better present-day realities and
future scenarios, and even to think outside the box. As Sir Andrew Noble (The Hague)
complained to Butler, ‘We are writing too much and thinking rather too little. ’107
Perhaps Millard, formerly Eden’s private secretary and currently a departmental
head in 1963, highlighted the central lesson for British policymakers. Pointing to
the failure of successive governments to accommodate foreign policy to post-1945
realities, and particularly to recognize that ‘our reduced circumstances ’ meant
that Britain could inﬂuence events but no longer command them, Millard opined
that ‘There is a lot of truth in the suggestion, made by Mr. Acheson in his
celebrated speech, that we have failed to ﬁnd our true role in the world. ’108
The creation of new pieces of machinery is not a substitute for policy. If there is a lesson to
be learned from General de Gaulle’s methods it is … that the inﬂuence which any state can
exert is vastly increased if it has clearly deﬁned national objectives. One of our troubles is
that we lack what one might call a philosophy of foreign policy. To a large extent we go on
answering telegrams without having any very clear idea of where exactly we want to get
to … we do not know what our national ends are supposed to be. This lack of philosophy is
more marked now than before in contrast with the Russians, the French.
As happened in the Abadan crisis, policy proved increasingly a function of
‘what was negotiable within Whitehall … the highest common factor of agree-
ment between entrenched bureaucrats ’ rather than a function of an informed
evaluation of Britain’s current and future interests and power.
107 Noble to Butler, 18 June 1963, NA, FO371/173334/WP30/5.
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